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Abstract 
Once an epidemic outbreak has been effectively contained through non-pharmaceutical 
interventions, a safe protocol is required for the subsequent release of social distancing 
restrictions to prevent a disastrous resurgence of the infection. We report individual-based 
numerical simulations of stochastic susceptible-infectious-recovered model variants on four 
distinct spatially organized lattice and network architectures wherein contact and mobility 
constraints are implemented. We robustly find that the intensity and spatial spread of the 
epidemic recurrence wave can be limited to a manageable extent provided release of these 
restrictions is delayed sufficiently (for a duration of at least thrice the time until the peak of the 
unmitigated outbreak) and long-distance connections are maintained on a low level (limited to 
less than five percent of the overall connectivity). 
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Introduction 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a severe global health crisis. Many countries have 
implemented stringent non-pharmaceutical control measures that involve social distancing and 
mobility reduction in their populations. This has led to remarkably successful deceleration and 
significant “flattening of the curve” of the infection outbreaks, albeit at tremendous economic and 
financial costs. At this point, societies are in dire need of designing a secure (partial) exit strategy 
wherein the inevitable recurrence of the infection among the significant non-immune fraction of 
the population can be thoroughly monitored with sufficient spatial resolution and reliable statistics, 
provided that dependable, frequent, and widespread virus testing capabilities are accessible and 
implemented. Until an effective and safe vaccine is widely available, this would ideally allow the 
localized implementation of rigorous targeted disease control mechanisms that demonstrably 
protect people’s health while the paralyzed branches of the economy are slowly rebooted. 
 
Mathematical analysis and numerical simulations of infection spreading in generic epidemic 
models are crucial for testing the efficacy of proposed mitigation measures, and the timing and 
pace of their gradual secure removal. Specifically, the employed mathematical models need to be 
(i) stochastic in nature in order to adequately account for randomly occurring or enforced disease 
extinction in small isolated communities, as well as for rare catastrophic infection boosts and (ii) 
spatially resolved such that they properly capture the significant emerging correlations among the 
susceptible and immune subpopulations. These distinguishing features are notably 
complementary to the more detailed and comprehensive computer models utilized by researchers 
at the University of Washington, Imperial College London, the Virginia Bioinformatics Institute, 
and others: see, e.g., (1-6). 
 
We report a series of detailed individual-based kinetic Monte Carlo computer simulation studies 
for stochastic variants (7,8) of the paradigmatic Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model 
(9,10) for a community of about 100,000 individuals. To determine the robustness of our results 
and compare the influence of different contact characteristics, we ran our stochastic model on 
four distinct spatially structured architectures, namely i) regular two-dimensional square lattices, 
wherein individuals move slowly and with limited range, i.e., spread diffusively; ii) two-dimensional 
small-world networks that in addition incorporate substantial long-distance interactions and 
contaminations; and finally on iii) random as well as iv) scale-free social contact networks. For 
each setup, we investigated epidemic outbreaks with model parameters informed by the known 
COVID-19 data (4). To allow for a direct comparison, we extracted the corresponding effective 
infection and recovery rates by fitting the peak height and the half-peak width of the infection 
growth curves with the associated classical deterministic SIR rate equations that pertain to a well-
mixed setting. We designed appropriate implementations of social distancing and contact 
reduction measures on each architecture by limiting or removing connections between 
individuals. This approach allowed us to generically assess the efficacy of non-pharmaceutical 
control measures.  
 
Although each architecture entails varied implementations of social distancing measures, we find 
that they all robustly reproduce both the resulting reduced outbreak intensity and growth speed. 
As anticipated, a dramatic resurgence of the epidemic occurs when mobility and contact 
restrictions are released too early. Yet if stringent and sufficiently long-lasting social distancing 
measures are imposed, the disease may go extinct in the majority of isolated small population 
groups. In our spatially extended lattice systems, disease spreading then becomes confined to 
the perimeters of a few larger outbreak regions, where it can be effectively localized and 
specifically targeted. For the small-network architecture, it is however imperative that all long-
range connections remain curtailed to a very low percentage for the control measures to remain 
effective. Intriguingly, we observe that an infection outbreak spreading through a static scale-free 
network effectively randomizes its connectivity for the remaining susceptible nodes, whence the 
second wave encounters a very different structure. 
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In the following sections, we briefly describe the methodology and algorithmic implementations as 
well as pertinent simulation results for each spatial or network structure; additional details are 
provided in the Supplementary Materials. We conclude with a comparison of our findings and a 
summary of their implications. 
 
 
Square lattices with diffusive spreading 
 
Our first architecture is a regular two-dimensional square lattice with linear extension  = 448 
subject to periodic boundary conditions (i.e., on a torus). Initially,  =  0
 +  0
 +  0
 =
100,000 individuals with fixed density  = / ≈ 0.5 are randomly placed on the lattice, with at 
most one individual allowed on each site. Almost the entire population begins in the susceptible 
state 0
; we start with only 0.1 % infected individuals, 0
 = 100, and no recovered (immune) 
ones, 0
 = 0. All individuals may then move to neighboring empty lattice sites with diffusion 
rate  (here we set this hopping probability to 1). Upon their encounter, infectious individuals 
irreversibly change the state of neighboring susceptible ones with set rate :  +  →  + . Any 
infected individual spontaneously recovers to an immune state with fixed rate :  → . (Details of 
the simulation algorithm are presented in the Supplementary Materials.) For the recovery rate, we 
choose 1/ ≅ 6.667 days (set to 0.15 Monte Carlo steps, MCS) informed by known COVID-19 
characteristics (4). To determine the infection rate , we run simulations for various values, fit the 
peak height and width of the ensuing epidemic curves with the corresponding SIR rate equations 
to extract the associated basic reproduction ratio  (as explained in the Supplementary 
Materials, see Figure S1), and finally select that value for  for our individual-based Monte Carlo 
simulations that reproduces the  ≈ 2.4 for COVID-19 (4). We perform 100 independent 
simulation runs with these reaction rates, from which we obtain the averaged time tracks for 
 
and 
, while of course 
 =  − 
 − 
 and 
 =    ′
 ′! . 
 
The standard classical SIR deterministic rate equations assume a well-mixed population and 
constitute a mean-field type of approximation wherein stochastic fluctuations and spatial as well 
as temporal correlations are neglected; see, e.g., (11,12). Near the peak of the epidemic 
outbreak, when many individuals are infected, this description is usually adequate, albeit with 
coarse-grained `renormalized’ rate parameters that effectively incorporate fluctuation effects at 
short time and small length scales. However, the mean-field rate equations are qualitatively 
insufficient when the infectious fraction 
/ is small, whence both random number fluctuations 
and the underlying discreteness and associated internal demographic noise become crucial (11-
13). Already near the epidemic threshold, which constitutes a continuous dynamical phase 
transition far from thermal equilibrium, c.f. Figure S3 in the Supplementary Materials, the kinetics 
is dominated by strong critical point fluctuations. These are reflected in characteristic initial power 
laws rather than simple exponential growth of the 
 and 
 curves (14), as demonstrated in 
Figure S1 (Supplemental Information).  
 
Nor can the deterministic rate equations capture stochastic disease extinction events that may 
occur at random in regions where the infectious concentration has reached small values locally. 
The rate equations may be understood to pertain to a static and fully connected network; in 
contrast, the spreading dynamics on a spatial setting continually rewires any infectious links 
keeping the epidemic active (6,15). Consequently, once the epidemic outbreak threshold is 
exceeded, the SIR rate equations markedly underestimate the time-integrated outbreak extent 
reflected in the ultimate saturation level " =  → ∞ 
, as is apparent in the comparison Figure 
S1 (Supplemental Information). 
 
Once the instantaneous fraction of the population has reached the threshold 10 %, 
 = 0.1 , 
we initiate stringent social distancing that we implement through a strong repulsive interaction 
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between any occupied lattice sites (with $% = 1), irrespective of their states ,  , or ; and 
correspondingly an attractive force between filled and empty ($% = 0) sites, namely the Ising 
lattice gas potential energy &{$%}
 = ) ∑  2 $% − 1
 +2 $, − 1-.%,,/  with dimensionless strength 
) = 1, where the sum extends only over nearest-neighbor pairs on the square lattice. The 
transfer of any individual from an occupied to an adjacent empty site is subsequently determined 
through the ensuing energy change ∆& by the Metropolis transition probability 1 =
 min{1, exp −∆&
} (16,17), which replaces the unmitigated hopping rate . As a result, both the 
mobility as well as any direct contact between individuals on the lattice are quickly and drastically 
reduced. For sufficiently small total density  =  /, most of the individuals eventually become 
completely isolated from each other. For our  = 0.5, the disease will continue to spread for a 
short period, until the repulsive potential has induced sufficient spatial anti-correlations between 
the susceptible individuals. The social-distancing interaction is sustained for a time duration 8, 
and then switched off again. 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
Figure 1 depicts two sets of Monte Carlo simulation snapshots, each beginning at the moment 
when social distancing is switched on. The second column shows the configurations when the 
repulsive interaction & is turned off again after respectively 8 = 2/ (top), and 8 = 10/ (bottom), 
while the last two sets of snapshots illustrate the subsequent resurgence of the outbreak (*). With 
increasing mitigation duration 8, the likelihood for the disease to locally go extinct in isolated 
population clusters grows markedly. As seen in the bottom row, the prevalence and spreading of 
the infection thus becomes confined to the perimeters of a mere few remaining centers. Hence 
we observe drastically improved mitigation effects for extended 8: As shown in Figure 2, the 
resurgence peak in the 
 curve assumes markedly lower values and is reached after much 
longer times. In fact, the time 98
 for the infection outbreak to reach its second maximum 
increases exponentially with the social-distancing duration, as evidenced in the inset of Figure 2 
(see also Figure 6 below). We emphasize that localized disease extinction and spatial 
confinement of the prevailing disease clusters represent correlation effects that cannot be 
captured in the SIR mean-field rate equation description. 
 
Figure 2 about here. 
 
 
Two-dimensional small-world networks 
 
In modern human societies, individuals as well as communities feature long-distance connections 
that represent `express’ routes for infectious disease spreading in addition to short-range links 
with their immediate neighbors. To represent this situation, we extend our regular lattice with 
diffusive propagation to a two-dimensional Newman-Watts small-world network (18), which was 
previously applied to the study of plant disease proliferation (19). In contrast to the Watts-Strogatz 
model (20), in which the small-world property is generated through rewiring bonds of a one-
dimensional chain of sites, a Newman-Watts small-world network may be constructed as follows: 
For each nearest-neighbor bond, a long-distance link (or `short-cut’) is added with probability : 
between randomly chosen pairs of vertices. As illustrated in Figure S2 (Supplemental 
Information), the resulting network features 2 :  long-distance links, with mean coordination 
number < < > =  4 1 +  :
. 
 
Again, each vertex may be in either of the states , , , or empty, and each individual can hop to 
another site along any (nearest-neighbor or long-distance) link with a total diffusivity . A typical 
snapshot of the SIR model on this small-world architecture is shown in Figure S2 (Supplemental 
Information). The unmitigated simulation parameters are:  = 1,000,  = 100,000, 0
 = 100,  =
1, and : = 0.6. The presence of long-range links increases the mean connectivity, rendering the 
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population more mixed, which in turn significantly facilitates epidemic outbreaks (see Figure S4 in 
the Supplemental Information). We remark that for the SIR dynamics, the Newman-Watts small-
world network effectively interpolates between a regular two-dimensional lattice and a scale-free 
network dominated by massively connected hubs; moreover, as the hopping probability  → 0, 
the small-world network is effectively rendered static. 
 
Figure 3 about here. 
 
In the two-dimensional small-world network, we may introduce social-distancing measures 
through two distinct means: i) We can globally diminish mobility by adopting a reduced overall 
diffusivity ? < 1; and/or ii) we can drastically reduce the probability of utilizing a long-distance 
connection to @ ≪ 1. We have found that the latter mitigation strategy of curtailing the infection 
short-cuts into distant regions has a far superior effect. Therefore, in Figure 3 we display the 
resulting data for such a scenario where we set @ = 0.05, yet kept the diffusivity unaltered at  =
1; as before, this control was triggered once 
 = 0.1  had been reached in the course of the 
epidemic. The resurgence peak height and growth rate become even more stringently reduced 
with extended mitigation duration than for (distinct) social distancing measures implemented on 
the regular lattice.  
 
 
Random and scale-free contact networks 
 
Finally, we run the stochastic SIR kinetics on two different static structures, namely i) randomly 
connected and ii) scale-free contact networks. Each network link may be in either the , , or  
configurations, which are subject to the SIR reaction rules, but we do not allow movement among 
the network vertices. For the random network, we uniformly distribute 1,000,000 edges among 
 = 100,000 nodes; this yields a Poisson distribution for the connectivity with preset mean (equal 
to the variance) < < > = ∆<
 = 20. For the scale-free network, we employ the Barabasi-Albert 
graph construction (21), where each new node is added successively with < = 4 edges, to yield a 
total of 799,980 edges. The connectivity properties in these quite distinct architectures are vastly 
different, since the scale-free networks feature prominent `hubs’ through which many other nodes 
are linked. In the epidemic context, these hubs represent super-spreader centers through which a 
large fraction of the population may become infected (8,22).  
 
To implement the stochastic SIR dynamics on either contact network, we employ the efficient 
rejection-free Gillespie dynamical Monte Carlo algorithm: Each reaction occurs successively, but 
the corresponding time duration between subsequent events is computed from the associated 
probability function (23) (for details, see Supplemental Information). The random social network 
may be considered an emulation of the well-connected mean-field model. Indeed, we obtain 
excellent agreement for the temporal evolution of the SIR kinetics in these two systems with  = 
0.15 MCS (for the scale-free network, a small adjustment to an effective mean-field recovery rate 
 ≈ 0.18 MCS is required). We implement a `complete lockdown’ mitigation strategy: Once the 
threshold 
 = 0.1  has been reached, we immediately cut all links for a subsequent duration 
8; during that time interval, only spontaneous recovery  →  can occur. 
 
Figure 4 about here. 
 
In Figure 4, we discern a markedly stronger impact of this lockdown on the intensity of the 
epidemic resurgence in both these static contact network architectures, see also Figure 6A 
below. On the other hand, the mitigation duration influences the second infection wave less 
strongly, with the time until its peak has been reached growing only linearly with 8: 98
 ~ 8, as is 
visible in Figure 6B. There is however a sharp descent in resurgent peak height beyond an 
apparent threshold 8 > 7/ for the random network, and 8 > 8/ for the scale-free network. For 
both the two-dimensional regular lattice and small-world structure, a similar sudden drop in the 
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total number of infected individuals (Figure 6B) requires a considerably longer mitigation duration: 
In these dynamical networks, the repopulation of nodes with infective individuals facilitates 
disease spreading, thereby diminishing control efficacy.  
 
We remark that if a drastically reduced diffusivity ? ≪ 1 is implemented, the small-world results 
closely resemble those for a randomly connected contact network (Figure 6A). 
 
Figure 5 about here.  
 
Moreover, we have observed an unexpected and drastic effective structural change in the scale-
free network topology as a consequence of the epidemic outbreak infecting its susceptible nodes. 
Naturally, the highly connected hubs are quickly affected, and through transitioning to the recovered 
state, become neutralized in further spreading the disease. As shown in Figure 5, as the infection 
sweeps through the network (in the absence of any lockdown mitigation), the distribution of the 
remaining active susceptible-infectious (SI) links remarkably changes from the initial scale-free 
power law with exponent −1/2 to a more uniform, almost randomized network structure.  The 
disease resurgence wave thus encounters a very different network topology than the original 
outbreak. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this study, we implemented social distancing control measures for simple stochastic SIR 
epidemic models on regular square lattices with diffusive spreading, two-dimensional Newman-
Watts small-world networks that include highly infective long-distance connections, and static 
contact networks, either with random connectivity or scale-free topology. In these distinct 
architectures, all disease spreading mitigation measures, be that through reduced mobility and/or 
curtailed connectivity, must of course be implemented at an early outbreak stage, but also 
maintained for a sufficient duration to be effective. In Figure 6, we compare salient features of the 
inevitable epidemic resurgence subsequent to the elimination of social distancing restrictions, 
namely the asymptotic fraction "/ of recovered individuals, i.e., the integrated number of 
infected individuals; and the time 98
 that elapses between the release and the peak of the 
second infection wave, both as function of the mitigation duration 8. We find that the latter grows 
exponentially with 8 on both dynamical lattice architectures, but only linearly on the static 
networks (Figure 6B). Furthermore, as one would expect, the mean-field rate equations pertaining 
to a fully connected system describe the randomly connected network very well.  
 
Figure 6 about here. 
 
In stark contrast to the mean-field results (indicated by the purple lines in Figure 6), the data for 
the lattice and network architectures reveal marked correlation effects that emerge at sufficiently 
long mitigation durations 8. For 8 > 8/ in the static networks, and 8 > 12/ in the lattice 
structures, the count of remaining infectious individuals  becomes quite low; importantly, these 
are also concentrated in the vicinity of a few persisting infection centers. This leads to a steep 
drop in "/ , the total fraction of ever infected individuals, by a factor of about 4 in the static 
network, and 3 in the dynamic lattice architectures. Thus, in these instances, follow-up disease 
control measures driven by high-fidelity testing and efficient contact tracking should be capable of 
effectively eradicating the few isolated disease resurgence centers. However, to reach these 
favorable configurations for the implementation of localized and targeted epidemic control, it is 
imperative to maintain the original social-distancing restrictions for at least a factor of three (better 
four) longer than it would have taken the unmitigated outbreak to reach its peak (8 ≈ 3/ … 6/ 
in our simulations) – for COVID-19 that would correspond to about two months. As is evident from 
our results for two-dimensional small-world networks that perhaps best represent human 
  
7 
 
interactions, it is also absolutely crucial to severely limit all far-ranging links between groups to 
less than 5 % of the overall connections, during the disease outbreak. 
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Figure 1. Stochastic SIR model simulation snapshots on a square lattice (with periodic 
boundary conditions). `Social distancing’ is turned on when the number of infective 
individuals reaches 
 =  0.1 , and subsequently maintained for a duration 8 =
22 GH = 2/ in the top, and 8 = 110 GH = 10/ in the bottom row. The green color 
marker is used for susceptible individuals, while red indicates infected and black 
recovered (immune or deceased) individuals. The first snapshots (leftmost column) 
capture the instance when mitigation is implemented. The second column marks the 
time when social distancing is turned off after additional time 8 has elapsed. The third 
and fourth columns show the ensuing spread of the disease. With extended social 
distancing duration 8 (bottom row), the infection becomes more likely to be driven to 
extinction in confined contact regions. Hence the number of active outbreak centers 
decreases drastically, which could facilitate disease control through effective testing 
and tracking. 
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Figure 2. Infection curves IJ
 for the stochastic SIR model on a square lattice. The graphs 
compare the outbreak data obtained without any mitigation (grey) and with social 
distancing measures implemented for different durations 8, as indicated. In all cases, 
social distancing is turned on once 
 reaches the set threshold of 10 % of the total 
population . The resurgent outbreak is drastically reduced in both its intensity and 
growth rate as social distancing is maintained for longer time periods 8. (The data for 
each curve were averaged over 100 independent realizations; the shading indicated 
statistical error estimates.)  Inset: time 9 to reach the second peak following the end of 
the mitigation; the data indicate an exponential increase of 9 with 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Infection curves IJ
 from stochastic SIR model simulations on a two-
dimensional Newman-Watts small-world network.  The graphs compare outbreak data without 
mitigation (grey) and for varying social-distancing intervention duration 8 (as indicated), during 
which the probability of moving through long-distance connections was drastically reduced to 
@  0.05. (The data for each curve were averaged over 100 independent realizations.) 
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Figure 4.  Infection outbreak curves IJ
 from stochastic SIR model simulations. (A) On a 
randomly connected network; (B) on a scale-free network with varying social-distancing 
intervention duration 8. (The data for each curve were averaged over 100 independent 
realizations.) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Distribution of the mean number of susceptible-infectious (SI) connections for 
the nodes in scale-free contact networks. (A) Network configuration before and (B-
F) while the epidemic surge is spreading through the system. (A) at   0; (B) after 5 
days; (C) after 10 days; (D) after 20 days, when the epidemic has reached its 
(unmitigated) peak; (E) after 30 days; (F) after 40 days, when only about 100 infectious 
individuals are left. (The data for each curve were averaged over 10,000 independent 
simulation runs.) 
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Figure 6.  Comparison of epidemic control measures through social distancing mitigation 
as functions of their duration K on the various architectures. (A) Recovered 
saturation fraction "/; (B) time 9 after release of the control measures until the 
infection resurgence peak is reached. 
 
 
Figure S1. Fit of infection curves from lattice simulations to the numerically integrated 
curves from the mean-field SIR rate equations. (A) Infectious population 
; (B) 
recovered number of individuals 
. The insets illustrate the power law initial growth 

 ~ L.MN.L and 
 ~ .ON.L for the lattice simulation data (averaged over 
100 independent realizations). 
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Figure S2: Schematic construction of a two-dimensional Newman-Watts small-world 
network. It is obtained from a regular square lattice through adding long-distance 
connections; shown is an SIR model configuration snapshot with empty, susceptible, 
infectious, and recovered states. 
 
 
 
Figure S3: Variation of the total fraction of recovered individuals P"/Q with the lattice 
simulation parameters in stochastic SIR model simulations on a square lattice on 
the total density R. (A) Data for different sets of nearest-neighbor hopping rates ; (B) 
for varying numbers of initially infected individuals 0
. The graphs demonstrate the 
presence of a percolation-like epidemic threshold. (Each data point was averaged over 
100 independent simulation runs.) 
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Figure S4: Epidemic peak value and total recovered fraction P" and peak intensity ISTUV. (A) 
As functions of the fraction : of long-distance links with fixed  = 1 (inset: same data, 
with the : axis on a logarithmic scale); (B) as functions of the diffusivity  with fixed : =
0.6 for the SIR model implemented on a two-dimensional Newman-Watts small-world 
network. (Each data point was averaged over 100 independent realizations.) 
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Supplemental Information 
 
 
Square lattices with diffusive spreading 
 
On our regular square lattice with  sites set on a two-dimensional torus, we implement the 
stochastic Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) epidemic model with the following individual-
based Monte Carlo algorithm: 
1. Randomly distribute  individuals on the lattice, subject to the restriction that each site 
may only contain at most one individual, and with period boundary conditions. Some 
small fraction of the individuals will initially be infectious, while the remainder of the 
population will be susceptible to the infection. 
2. Perform random sequential updates  times in one Monte Carlo step (MCS) by picking a 
lattice site at random, and then performing the following actions: 
a. If the selected site contains a susceptible  or a recovered individual , a 
hopping direction is picked randomly. If the adjacent lattice site in the hopping 
direction is empty, then the chosen individual is moved to that neighboring site 
with hopping probability  that is related to a macroscopic diffusion rate. 
b. If the chosen lattice site contains an infectious individual , it will first try to infect 
each susceptible nearest neighbor  with a prescribed infection probability . If 
this attempt is successful, the involved susceptible neighbor  immediately 
changes its state to infected . After the originally selected infected individual has 
repeated its infection attempts with all neighboring susceptibles , it may reach 
the immune state  with recovery probability . Finally, this particular individual, 
whether still infectious or recovered, tries to hop in a randomly picked direction 
with probability , provided the chosen adjacent lattice site is empty. 
3. Repeat the procedures in item 2 for a preselected total number of Monte Carlo steps. 
 
Figure S1 about here. 
 
To determine the effective (coarse-grained) basic epidemic reproduction ratio , we fit the 
infection curves to straightforward numerical integrations of the deterministic SIR rate equations 

/ =  − 
 
/, 
/ =   
 
/ −  
, 
/ =   
, and adjust the 
lattice simulation infection probability  ≈ 1.0 and to a lesser extent, the recovery probability  to 
finally match the targeted COVID-19 value  ≈ 2.4. We note that this slightly `renormalized’ 
value for  is subsequently utilized to set the time axis scale in the figures. On the mean-field 
level, initially  = /
 0
/, since all nodes are mutually connected. In spatial settings, 
0
/ is to be replaced with the mean connectivity (i.e., the coordination number for a regular 
lattice) to susceptible individuals. The lattice simulation data is fitted with the mean-field result by 
matching two parameters: the maximum value and the half-peak width of the infectious 
population curve 
, see Figure S1. The lattice simulation curve digresses from the mean-field 
curves at low 
 values, far away from the peak region. In the lattice simulations, the initial rise 
of the infectious population curve exhibits power-law growths 
 ~ L.M±.L and 
 ~ .O±.L in 
clear contrast with the simple exponential rise of the mean-field SIR curve as obtained from 
integrating the mean-field rate equations. We note that these are the standard critical exponents 
W and 1 + W for the temporal growth of an active seed cluster near a continuous non-equilibrium 
phase transition to an absorbing extinction state (11). 
 
Figures S2 about here. 
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Figure S2 shows the dependence of the asymptotic number of recovered individuals " on the 
density  for various sets of hopping rates  and initial infectious population values 0
. These 
data indicate the existence of a well-defined epidemic threshold, i.e., a percolation-like sharp 
transition from a state when only a tiny fraction of individuals is infected, to the epidemic state 
wherein the infection spreads over the entire population (11). As one would expect, this critical 
point depends only on the ratio / of the recovery and hopping rates. Varying the lattice 
simulation parameters just shifts the location of the epidemic threshold. Once the model 
parameters are set in the epidemic spreading regime, the system’s qualitative behavior is thus 
generic and robust, and only weakly depends on precise parameter settings.   
 
 
Two-dimensional small-world networks 
 
Figure S3 about here. 
 
For our two-dimensional small-world network, whose construction is schematically depicted in 
Figure S3, we employ a similar Monte Carlo algorithm as described above; the essential 
difference is that individuals may now move to adjacent nearest-neighbor as well as to distant 
lattice sites along the pre-set `short-cut’ links. Figure S4A demonstrates (for fixed diffusivity  =
1) that as function of the fraction : of long-distance links in a two-dimensional small-world 
network, the epidemic threshold resides quite close to zero: The presence of a mere few `short-
cuts’ in the lattice already implies a substantial population mixing. The inset, where the : axis is 
scaled logarithmically, indicates that sizeable outbreaks begin for : ≥ 0.05. Figure S4B similarly 
shows the outbreak dependence on the diffusion rate  (here for : = 0.6), with the threshold for 
epidemic spreading observed at  ≈ 0.3. Evidently, prevention of disease outbreaks in this 
architecture requires that both mobility and the presence of far-ranging connections be stringently 
curtailed. 
 
Figure S4 about here. 
 
 
Random and scale-free contact networks 
 
For both the randomly connected and scale-free contact networks, we employ the Gillespie or 
dynamical Monte Carlo algorithm, which allows for efficient numerical simulations of Markovian 
stochastic processes. It consists of these subsequent steps: 
1. Initially, few nodes are assigned to be infected , while all other nodes are set in the 
susceptible state . Each susceptible node  is characterized by a certain number of 
active links that are connected to infected nodes . 
2. We then determine the rate at which each infected node  will recover, and at which each 
susceptible node  with a non-zero number of active links becomes infected. From these 
we infer the total event rate !Y!.  
3. Based on this total rate !Y!, we select the waiting time until the next event occurs from an 
exponential distribution with mean !Y!. 
4. We then select any permissible event with a probability proportional to its rate, update the 
status of each node, and repeat these processes for the desired total number of 
iterations. 
 
